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1 Introduction and the problem
Impact evaluation should have a central role in
evidence-based policymaking. But, whilst the USAID
Health Bureau has prided itself on taking
international leadership in evidence-based results
monitoring and comprehensive evaluations, attention
to evaluation has declined in recent years.
The earlier technical excellence of the USAID Health
Bureau in evaluation methods was demonstrated by
the development of the LOG FRAME in the late
1970s and subsequent development documents
(TIPS: http://evalweb.usaid.gov/resources/tipsseries.cfm)
and operational guidance for Agency operations
(Center for Development, Information and
Evaluation (CDIE), USAID, www.USAID.gov/us;
Automated Directives System (ADS), USAID,
www.USAID.gov/policy). But since 1994 there has
been a steep decline in the quantity and quality of
evaluation; the number of evaluation studies falling
from a peak of 497 a year to a low of 104 in 1998
(Clapp-Wincek and Blue 2001). This decline has been
attributed to many factors, including Albert Gore’s
policy change on ‘reinventing government’, a sharp
reduction in technical staff, and a change in USAID
Guidance from requiring every project to be
evaluated to recommending that evaluations only be
done in response to management need. 
Since 2000, there have been several Agency-wide
and Bureau-specific reviews of evaluation (e.g. Clapp-
Wincek and Blue 2001; and Weber 2004), which
have demonstrated the loss of institutional learning
and best practices. While the country USAID
missions depended on evaluations, their greatest
concern was the very limited number of in-depth
programme evaluations. Moreover, while the
partners did many of the evaluations, USAID did not
(Clapp-Wincek and Blue 2001: iii), and those few
evaluations supported by the missions were not
being submitted to the Development Exchange
Clearinghouse (DEC). 
Evaluation quality has long been an issue with
USAID, both Agency-wide (e.g., Hopstock et al. 1989)
and in the technical bureaux (e.g. Adamchak et al.
2004 for Health; Bollen et al. 2005 for Democracy
and Governance). Many evaluation reports do not
include more than a few paragraphs on method, and
many were qualitative and unsystematic: the
expatriate ‘fly-in’ assessment where a team comes
for 2–3 weeks and bases its findings only on
qualitative interviews with key informants and
stakeholders. Most reviews of USAID evaluations
found weak methods employed, even with external,
professional evaluators whose objectivity was often
compromised by their desire to please the managers
and continue to be hired. This article documents
these trends in recent years, analysing the factors
behind them and the steps required to ensure the
production of more and better impact studies.
The focus of this study is on the methodological
strength and design rigour of evaluations of outcomes,
effects, and impacts. White (2006) defines impact as
the counterfactual analysis of how an intervention
affects final welfare outcomes. In that sense, we want
to know if the donor-funded activities are attaining
their expected results as set out in the project paper
and the results framework or the monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) design. However, since donors fund
too few real impact evaluations of project attribution
and the counterfactual, evaluators have often been
limited to considering whether the project achieved
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its intended outcome in its intervention areas or
groups, preferably as compared to control groups.
Moreover, in order to inform future programming,
evaluation must be transparent and externally credible
to decision-makers. However, without the rigour of
an impact evaluation these attributes are harder to
achieve.
2 Methodology
There are three main approaches taken in this article:
1 A document review of evaluation design,
methods, training, and technical leadership in
M&E was carried out. These included activities of
the flagship USAID/Global Health (GH)
evaluation-related projects: MEASURE/Evaluation
(Monitoring and Evaluation to Assess and Use
Results); Frontiers and Horizons Operations
Research; Data for Decision-making, including:
State of the Art papers, M&E Reference and
Working Groups, Task Forces; International M&E
and Operations Research Regional Training and
Capacity-building; M&E Working group survey
and needs assessment (2005); and finally, M&E
manuals, guidelines, indicators (see website at:
www.cpc.edu/measure/evaluation).
2 A meta-analysis review of Global Health
evaluation documents and their design in the last
few years. These included: Strategic Planning and
Results/Portfolio Reviews in 2005 and 2006,
which were a stocktake of the number and types
of evaluations per technical office; and a
systematic meta-analysis of Global Health
evaluations of designs and methodological
approaches of 93 GH-funded projects, sub-
projects and interventions from 2004–6. Table 1
shows the revised classification during the
content analysis of evaluation designs.
3 An opinion survey and follow-up interviews with
47 experienced USAID evaluators. These surveys
covered ten content areas, soliciting their
experience about methodological rigour; the
quality of the team; the issues raised; technical,
operational, and behavioural constraints; and the
use of the findings for policy and programme
change. There was dissemination of the findings,
much discussion, and further in-depth
investigation.
3 Findings and results
3.1 Agency-wide and global health planning and
leadership in evaluation
Given the deterioration in quality and quantity of
evaluations in the 1994–2004 period, and the highly
critical 2004 assessment of evaluations (Weber 2004),
the USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios, decided to
revitalise evaluation, with the active implementation
support of CDIE. Following direct consultations with
field missions and central bureaux (Adams 2005;
Kerley and Croake 2005), the Administrator sent a
directive to the field outlining the strategy and actions
needed, along with a much-needed training package
(Natsios 2005). This process was cut short after less
than a year by his replacement with a new Federal
Director of Foreign Assistance.
Under Ambassador Tobias’ new administration, CDIE,
with its experienced evaluators, was disbanded, and its
mother bureau moved over to the State Department,
where all M&E was to be coordinated. The
consequent Federal/State office dropped the
revitalisation plans for evaluation, in favour of strict
activity and output reporting (Operational Plans) for
budgeting purposes. Moreover, the quantitative and
analytical Results Frameworks and Packages, Strategic
Objectives and Intermediate Results, and Performance
Monitoring Plans (PMPs) were down-played, and
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Table 1 Classification system for evaluation designs
Revised classification of USAID health project evaluation design
A. Programme interventions and project components: B. Child Survival projects:
1. Post hoc cross-sectional 1. Post hoc cross-sectional
2. Baseline & post-intervention 2. Baseline and post-intervention 
3. Baseline & post-intervention with comparison/control 
area/group (QED-light)
outcome-oriented annual reports were reduced to
annual operational plans for output reporting.
In 2003–4, the Global Health Bureau was entering
into a paradigm shift whereby the Emergency
Presidential Initiatives in HIV/AIDS (PEFPAR), in
malaria (PMI), and Avian Influenza were also shifting
away from evaluation and towards strategic
information systems and output monitoring.
Federal/State required the development of common
indicators under eight common objectives or
‘elements’ and cross-cutting sub-elements. Whilst
defining common indicators assists in the alignment
of monitoring indicators with Agency objectives and
the aggregation of results, there is a tension with the
need for M&E systems to be context-specific. More
importantly, outcome monitoring is not the same as
evaluation since it says nothing about attribution.1
However, the Family Planning/Reproductive Health
and Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition office
management and technical advisors agreed to
maintain their technical leadership in evaluation, and
developed several strategies to strengthen M&E. They:
1 Supported their own Assessment of Programme
M&E (Adamchak et al. 2004) which recommended
less monitoring and more rigorous evaluation; 
2 Formed an M&E working group among the
USAID partners and collaborating agencies, which
recommended more training and sharing of
lessons learned (Teller and Pandit 2004);
3 Developed a new conceptual framework and
indicators, designed programme ‘pathways’ and
coordinated an annual results review;
4 Used the showcase MEASURE, and sub-
cooperating agencies, to refine the tools and
methods necessary to generate, analyse, coordinate,
and disseminate information for evaluation,
programme learning, and capacity-building, and to
develop a programme results system. 
3.2 Findings of the meta-analysis of methodological
rigour 
Here we highlight those findings relevant to the
rigour of the design of outcome and impact
evaluations, both for projects and sub-project
components. In the introduction to this issue, White
and Bamberger define the stronger ‘real world’
evaluations as those with a quasi-experimental
design, particularly those which have baseline and
end-line data and both treatment and control groups
(see also Bamberger et al. 2006). The USAID
clearinghouse contains only 31 evaluation studies a
year for the period 2004–6 (Figure 1, a total of 93),
though as already noted, not all documents are
submitted and others are restricted as procurement-
sensitive. 
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Figure 1 Annual number of global health evaluations in the USAID clearinghouse: 2004–6
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Most of the 93 assessments on evaluation design
were pre-post child survival project designs
(Figure 2), as required by the USAID Child Survival
Grants Program, while other studies had post hoc
end-line designs, which are often unable to deliver
reliable impact estimates. The non-child survival
evaluations had stronger designs: quasi-experimental
with comparison groups (Figure 2). In the DEC
classification scheme, most of those classified as
assessments or intervention studies were more
rigorous than those classified as evaluations
(Figure 3).
3.3 Expert survey and in-depth interviews
From the list of Team Leaders, frequent evaluator
practitioners, and USAID evaluations advisors, over
60 experts were selected. Most were sent semi-
structured surveys and did respond, sometimes in
person; over 90 per cent were followed up by
telephone or inter-personal interviews. The main
findings are:
z Evaluation planning and design: there is a lack
of adequate project needs assessments prior to
baselines; an over-reliance on outputs and
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Figure 2 Evaluation design classifications: 2004–6
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Figure 3 Evaluation design classifications by clearinghouse categories global health projects 2004–6
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milestones, instead of on project outcomes or
attribution; and project designs are often driven
by externalities and ‘fashions of the month’.
z Evaluation implementation: team members,
stakeholders, and counterparts were often
inexperienced and untrained in evaluation methods,
e.g. former USAID Mission directors hired as Team
Leaders despite little hands-on experience in
evaluation methods. Also, USAID managers were
critical of external evaluators coming in with their
own ‘agendas,’ lacking enough knowledge of project
context, and seeking to please senior administration
officials. We also found a lack of an enabling
environment from senior management and an
erosion of the culture of evaluation in the field. 
z Follow-up and use of evaluations: a common
criticism was the undue influence of key
stakeholders on final recommendations. Most
frustrating to the evaluation experts was that critical
project decisions were made before evaluation
finished. Evaluators rarely found out whether or not
their key recommendations were carried out.
A key question raised by USAID strategic health
planning, other technical, and programme offices in
preparation for designing a new evaluation agenda,
given the shortage of time and resources, is what
and when is it best to evaluate. Table 2 shows a
summary of expert opinion on the subject.
4 Discussion: constraints to producing and
using rigorous evaluations
There are no doubt many constraints to designing
and implementing strong, rigorous health
evaluations, as noted in the newer articles, including
White and Bamberger in this issue (see also
Bamberger et al. 2006; Victora et al. 2004). From my
experience as evaluation advisor within the Global
Health Bureau, inside USAID country missions, while
on secondment to developing country governments,
and as a consultant in M&E for health sector NGOs
and private sector partners, I would list the main
constraints recorded from the experts inside and
outside USAID/GH in four categories:
1 Technical: Contemporary impact evaluation designs
need to be rigorous, requiring multivariate
analytical skills. Training opportunities for these skills
are limited, and experience in their application is
even more limited. Moreover, some of the content
of these training courses is not that useful in the
real world of health and development (Reynolds et
al. 2006) or in poor and unstable countries. There is
concern amongst donors over lack of usefulness of
some past evaluations, especially when these have
been superficial or carried out at times when they
were not needed. Moreover, M&E experts are
located more within institutional partners and
independent consultants than within the donor.
2 Organisational: There is common knowledge of
hiding evaluations: many evaluations are not made
public, either because they are procurement-
sensitive and then never released, too critical, or
poorly done. Organisations tend to self-promote
and apply a positive ‘spin’ in their own self-
interest, advertising competencies for new
proposal competition. Moreover, there has been a
decline in the number and continuity of USAID
technical advisors and contract officers, and a lack
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Table 2 What and when is it best to evaluate?
What When
z M&E systems built into project proposal before z Decisions on replication, extension, scaling up
award decision
z Critical interventions need strong evaluations z At end of 4th year of most five-year projects
z Innovative activities and interventions whose z Monitor extensively, evaluate selectively’
practical effectiveness not yet rigorously 
evaluated  z Major challenges need in-depth analysis into the causes
z Multidisciplinary and contextual factors (the 
counter-factual; value-added) z Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)  data show 
unexpected changes
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of senior M&E positions in many country missions
and Washington GH offices. As in most
international organisations, there is tension over
local autonomy of programme resource use
between central and country USAID offices.
3 Political: The Agency’s effort in 2005 to revitalise
evaluation demonstrated the inadequate political
will to make sufficient resources available for its
implementation. What took priority in 2006 was
the explicit absorption of USAID into the new
State Department policy goal of Transformational
Diplomacy and a focus on politically important
countries (e.g. Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan). The fear that negative evaluations will
play into the hands of the foreign aid critics in
Congress and the State Department produces
fear of the visibility of failures and mistakes. 
4 Behavioural: These restraints include the career
ambitions, roles, and interests of individuals and
affinity groups to act for their own benefit.
Careers can be threatened, given the lack of a
reward system for strong evaluations in order to
learn from mistakes. There is a lack of managerial
motivation, and a lack of professional incentives
for technical advisors, for rigorous evaluations.
Finally, the time pressures of administrative tasks
often crowd out the institutional learning tasks.
Figure 4 represents in schematic form the frustrating
experience of what has often happened to the
proposed or actual designs of rigorous evaluations in
the last four years. It is estimated that few (less than
20 per cent) of these designs were either approved
for funding, or implemented with rigour. All the real
world constraints came to bear in creating this major
leakage of credibility.
4 Conclusions and recommendations for
institutional learning
This article has documented the precipitous decline
in the number and quality of USAID-wide evaluation
designs accessed through the USAID Document
Exchange Clearinghouse (DEC) between 1994 and
2006. We used three methods to analyse this
decline and the factors behind it:
1 Results and Portfolio Review assessment of
evaluation of over 100 ongoing centrally funded
projects in Global Health in fiscal year (FY)
2005–6; 
2 Meta-analysis of 93 project and sub-project/
intervention evaluations done in 2004–6 accessed
in the DEC; and 
3 Opinion survey and interviews of 47 experienced
USAID evaluation experts, both internal and
external, about their issues and suggestions.
The findings point to the legitimacy of the concern
of senior management about the weaknesses of the
Results Review component of the Portfolio Review
Process. There are too many missed opportunities as
well as institutionalised constraints to learning more
about what works and what needs improvement in
the GH portfolio. Results reporting cannot take the
place of impact studies to examine attribution. Thus
transparent and evidenced-based policy and strategic
planning decisions have been compromised in the
process. The constraints to stronger evaluation
discussed above – technical, organisational, political,
and behavioural – are formidable, and will require a
concerted effort to overcome.
4.1 Implications and recommendations
After the aborted attempt of the Natsios
administration to revitalise evaluation, and the
Federal/State focus on short-term operational plans
and budget-related output monitoring, the GH
Bureau has been considering measures to revitalise
evaluation. The demise of CDIE, the lack of an
autonomous M&E unit in Global Health, and the
complicated US Government inter-agency evaluation
structures of the Presidential Health Initiatives all
work against a credible, flexible, and transparent
approach to programme evaluations. 
The development of a new evaluation agenda during
FY 08 is an important first step for USAID, though it
must be supported by the political will to allocate
sufficient priority to and resources for both central
and mission learning needs. This could be considered
as moving forwards in a more coordinated manner
with other donors on more rigorous impact and
programme evaluation. A minimum set of
recommendations for this new evaluation agenda is
suggested below.
z A high-level, autonomous (from the technical
offices) evaluation group (AEG) or division,
including strategic information and analysis, within
the Programme Office. It should be able to
design rigorous impact and outcome evaluations,
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including cost-effectiveness; complemented by a
stable consultant group of independent health
evaluation experts;
z An evaluation agenda to be developed by the AEG
in consultation with the technical offices and given
a proper place within the new Health Strategy;
z Rigorous programme evaluations, guided by the
Bureau-wide evaluation, every five years before
the next project approval cycle; needs
assessments, baselines, and mid-term M&E
systems in most projects;
z Capacity-building, professional development, and
training, guided by best practices in M&E, to be
supported for M&E and programme design staff –
both within USAID and for partners; 
z A responsive knowledge and documentation
centre reorganised to serve the information,
analysis, evaluation, and decision-making needs of
the Global Health Bureau. This should be
organised in coordination with the Agency-wide
centre.
IDS Bulletin Volume 39  Number 1  March 2008 97
Notes
* Formerly Senior Technical Advisor in
Monitoring/Evaluation, Global Health Bureau,
USAID, Washington, DC.
1 Reference is made here to the triple-A
requirement for Agency-wide monitoring
systems: aggregation (being able to aggregate
results across interventions), attribution (being
able to link changes in outcomes to the
intervention), and alignment (if indicators of
project success indicate achievement of the
agency’s overall goals); see White (2004).
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